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This study compares alternative designs of an unfunded pension system. Convex 
combinations between a fixed contribution rate and a fixed benefit rate are considered. The 
objective is to maximize the expected ex-ante welfare under stochastic fertility. The model is 
a three-period CGE framework where the design of the education system and effects on factor 
prices are accounted for. The effects on factor prices depend on the degree of capital mobility. 
For low degrees of capital mobility it is optimal to have a fixed benefit rate in the pension 
system. But for the small open economy, a fixed contribution rate is optimal if the education 
system has a fixed benefit rate. This design of education and pension systems assures that 
individuals in the small open economy are unaffected by fertility fluctuations. 
JEL Code: J13, H55, H52. 
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Unfunded pension systems are sensitive to changes in the dependency ratios.
Given the ongoing shift in the demographic structure, particulary the increase
in old age dependency, several countries have re-designed their pension sys-
tems. While still mainly unfunded, they now have a ¯xed contribution rate
instead of a ¯xed replacement rate. Is a ¯xed contribution rate the preferred
design when considering changes in dependency ratios?
Changes in old age dependency ratios can arise from three main sources:
fertility, mortality, and migration. This paper deals solely with changes that
arise from fertility °uctuations. Such changes are a major source of changing
demographic structure and they a®ect economic conditions throughout the
life-cycle.1 Initially, fertility shocks alter the young age dependency ratio and
thus a®ect another important intergenerational transfer system, the educa-
tion system. Further down the life-cycle, fertility °uctuations a®ect factor
prices via changes in the capital labor ratio; how much factor prices change
depends on the degree of capital mobility. In the ¯nal stage of the life-cycle,
the old age dependency ratio shifts, which a®ects the pension system. Thus,
it is necessary to account for the e®ects on the education system, and on
factor prices, when trying to ¯nd the optimal pension design with respect to
fertility °uctuations.
The aim of this paper is to ¯nd the unfunded pension design that yields
the highest expected ex ante welfare when fertility °uctuates, while taking
account of the education system and the degree of capital mobility. Welfare
is measured according to a standard utilitarian welfare function. This cor-
responds to ¯nding the pension scheme that the individuals would choose
behind the veil of ignorance, i.e. before knowing if they will belong to a large
or a small generation. Two thought experiments are conducted. First, the
individuals are allowed to choose both the design of the education system and
the pension system for a given degree of capital mobility. Second, they are
only allowed to choose the design of the pension system for a given education
system and degree of capital mobility. The pension system and the education
system are restricted to be intergenerational transfer systems. These results
are then compared to the market outcome without state intervention when
children are capable of making contractual arrangements with the adults.
From the pension literature it is known that alternative unfunded pension
schemes have very di®erent distributional properties.2 In a unfunded system
1Among others Cutler et al. (1990) stresses the fact that fertility °uctuations are im-
portant.
2See for instance Hassler and Lindbeck (1997), Th¿gersen (1998), Lindbeck (2000) and
Wagener (2003).
2changes in the old age dependency ratio alter the contributions from the
workers, the bene¯ts to the retirees, or both. Which of these alternatives that
occurs depends on how the pension system is designed. In this paper I analyze
convex combinations between a pure ¯xed contribution rate (FC scheme) and
a pure ¯xed bene¯t rate (FB scheme).3 In the pure FC scheme the workers
always pay a certain fraction of their income to the system, irrespective of
the dependency ratio. In a pure FB scheme retirees are guaranteed a certain
fraction of current workers' income. Convex combinations between these two
extremes imply that both workers and retirees are a®ected by changes in
dependency ratios.
Like the pension system, the education system is mainly ¯nanced by inter-
generational transfers and thus the same issues arise when fertility changes.
A changing young age dependency ratio will alter the contributions from the
workers, the education received by children, or both. Again it is natural
to consider a ¯xed contribution rate or a ¯xed bene¯t rate as the extreme
cases. Convex combinations between FC and FB for the education system
determine how workers and children share the e®ect of varying young age
dependency.
To assume that the education system is a convex combination between
these two extreme types is not as restrictive as it may seem. This way of
modelling does not hinge on a particular rationale for why the education
system is ¯nanced via intergenerational transfers. It simply uses the budget
restriction, which must be satis¯ed by any endogenously determined educa-
tion system as well. What the analysis excludes are responses such that total
spending on education falls, or that the bene¯t per student increases, when
there are many to educate. It is hard to imagine any endogenous response
that would yield such an outcome.
The main result is that the preferred pension design depends crucially on
the degree of capital mobility. With no capital mobility, a pure FB pension
scheme maximizes expected welfare. A FB pension scheme implies that a
large generation receives the gain from the decrease in old age dependency
ratio that occurs in the pension system. This is motivated since the large
generation receives a lower wage due to capital dilution. Put di®erently, the
reason why the FB pension scheme is preferred is that the returns on physical
capital will be negatively correlated with the return on human capital.
For a fully open economy, when factor prices are una®ected by fertility
changes, the optimal pension design is a FC scheme if the education system
has a FB design. With this design for the education and pension systems,
3This convexity approach is similar to the one used in Wagener (2004). Note that a
¯xed bene¯t rate is not the same as a ¯xed replacement rate.
3the individuals in the small open economy are una®ected by fertility changes.
Thus, although the education system and the pension system are sensitive
to fertility °uctuations, if properly designed the two e®ects can cancel each
other out.
When analyzing public transfer systems, it is important to have in mind
why these systems exist and what their purpose is. One rationale for having
these systems is that the immaturity of children prevents e±cient arrange-
ments between them and the adults (e.g. Becker and Murphy (1988), Rangel
(2003)). Thus it is of interest to compare the allocations that occur with ex-
ogenous systems with the market outcome, that would arise if children could
make e±cient contracts with the adults. Such analysis is conducted in the
end of the paper.4 It is shown that the payments from the workers to the
retired that arise in the market outcome resemble a ¯xed contribution rate.
That is, the workers transfer a ¯xed share of their income to the retired.
Previous studies that have investigated preferred pension designs can be
divided into two strands. The ¯rst includes studies that focus on fertility
°uctuations in a closed economy setup, e.g. Smith (1982), Blomquist and
Wijkander (1994), and Bohn (2001). These studies ¯nd that a large cohort
faces less favorable factor prices compared to surrounding generations. To
counter the e®ects of changes in capital intensity the pension system should
have a varying contribution rate. Second, there are studies that focus on fac-
tor price uncertainty in a small open economy setup (e.g. Th¿gersen (1998)
and Wagener (2003)). The conclusion from these studies is inconclusive from
an ex ante perspective.5
This paper di®ers from previous studies since it allows for varying degrees
of openness and takes into account the e®ect on the education system. I ¯nd
that previously obtained results for the closed economy hold irrespective
of how the education system is designed. Moreover, the preferred ex ante
pension design is identi¯ed for all degrees of openness. Optimal pension
design is shown to depend crucially on the degree of capital mobility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the general equilibrium model. In section 3, the model is calibrated and
the steady state results are presented. Section 4 presents the results, while
section 5 compares these results to the market outcome, in which the inter-
generational contracts are determined endogenously. Section 6 contains some
¯nal remarks.
4The market outcome analysis is similar to the analysis in Boldrin and Montes (2005).
5From an ex post perspective, when the uncertainty has been realized, Wagener (2003)
shows that the ¯xed replacement rate is preferred.
42 The model
The framework consists of a three period overlapping generations model,
with four main components: individuals who maximize their lifetime utility,
¯rms which maximize their pro¯t, an international capital market, and the
intergenerational transfer systems for education and pension. There is also
an standard intergenerational welfare function, similar to the one applied in
Boadway et al. (1991), which will be used to evaluate optimal pension design.
2.1 Modelling the transfers
The OLG model consists of one period when young, one period when work-
ing, and one period when retired. The young receive contributions from the
working population via the education system, and the retired receive contri-
butions from the working population via the pension system. For the systems
to be pure intergenerational transfers it is necessary that the budgets are bal-
anced in each period. Assuming a period-by-period balanced budget for each
system separately, makes it possible to state the transfers in period t as:6
bE;tNt = dE;tNt¡1; (1)
bP;tNt¡2 = dP;tNt¡1; (2)
where bE;t denotes the per child bene¯t from the education system, dE;t is
the contribution per worker to the education system, bP;t is the bene¯t per
retired from the pension system, and dP;t denotes the contribution per worker
to the pension system. These are indexed with subscript t to denote that
the transfer occurs in period t. The size of each generation is denoted by N,
where the subscript t indicates in which period the generation is born.
So far, the contributions and bene¯ts were not related to the level of
income in society. In a world with growing income over time it would not
make sense to have ¯xed bene¯ts/contributions over time. It is reasonable to
relate the bene¯ts/contributions to the income, where income refers to the
mean income of the working generation.
Let ~ wt denote the mean labor income of the workers in period t, and let
¿E;t and ¿P;t denote the contribution rate devoted for ¯nancing the education
and the pension system, respectively. The contribution from the workers,
di;t, where i = E;P, can then be stated as:
di;t = ~ wt¿i;t: (3)
6The assumption regarding two separate systems is mainly based on the fact the existing
social security programs have a very weak connection with the education system, if any.
5The received bene¯ts, bi;t, can also be related to the income level of the
working population according to:
bi;t = ~ wt°i;t; (4)
where °i;t are the bene¯t rates in the transfer systems. The bene¯t rates are
the fraction of active workers income that each child/retired receives.7
The period-by-period balanced budget constraints for the two transfer
systems can now be rewritten as:
°E;t = ¿E;t=nt; (5)
°P;t = ¿P;tnt¡1; (6)
where nt denotes the young age dependency ratio in period t, i.e. Nt=Nt¡1,
and hence the old age dependency ratio, Nt¡2=Nt¡1, equals n
¡1
t¡1. Changes
in dependency ratios must a®ect either the contribution rate or the bene¯t
rate, or both.
Various intergenerational transfer schemes di®er in how the bene¯ts and
the contributions respond to changes in dependency ratios. The di®erence
between the schemes can be understood from the balanced budget restric-
tions. From equations (5) and (6) two simple schemes emerge. Either the
bene¯t rate is ¯xed, °i;t = °i, or the contribution rate is ¯xed, ¿i;t = ¿i.
These schemes will simply be referred to as ¯xed bene¯t rate, FB, and ¯xed
contribution rate, FC. These are the two extreme cases. To allow for convex
combinations between the extreme cases, the same approach as in Wagener
(2004) will be used.8 The bene¯t formula for the education and the pension
system are stated as:
bE;t = ~ wt°E(ÁE + (1 ¡ ÁE)n=nt); (7)
bP;t = ~ wt°P(ÁP + (1 ¡ ÁP)nt¡1=n); (8)
where n is the steady state population growth and Ái 2 (0;1) indicates
under which scheme the systems operate. The extreme cases are Ái = 0,
7The term bene¯t rate is not to be confused with the term replacement rate. The
bene¯t rate is a theoretical abstraction and is also used in Lindbeck (2000), though not
using the same term. In the pension literature it sometimes occurs that the replacement
rate refers to the fraction of current income (what is referred to as the bene¯t rate in this
paper). This is, however, conceptually obscure since the bene¯ts of the present pensioners
does not replace the wages of present workers. Augustinovics (1999), among others, has
also pointed at this misuse i the literature.
8There are some di®erences compared to Wagener (2004). Since the PAYG pension is
a political process in his modell, it means that the pension system is not a priori ¯xed.
Also he models the convex combination between the FC scheme and the FR scheme
6which corresponds to a pure FC scheme, and Ái = 1, which corresponds to
a pure FB scheme. In the latter case °i is simply the ¯xed bene¯t rate.
When Ái = 0, °En represents the ¯xed contribution rate in the education
system, and °E=n becomes the ¯xed contribution rate in the pension system.
The intermediate cases when Ái 2 [0;1] are convex combinations between
the extreme cases. The parameter Ái determines to which extent changes to
dependency ratios a®ect the contributors versus bene¯ciaries.
The extreme points are quite natural for the education system, but for
the pension system a note is warranted. Usually the ¯xed replacement rate,
FR scheme is considered as the opposite of the FC scheme. In this case the
bene¯ts received in the pension system are related to previous income instead
of current income, i.e. the income from one's own active life. The main
reason for why the FR scheme is excluded is because this scheme removes all
incentives for the workers to invest in human capital of coming generations.
This scheme could never mimic the market outcome.9
2.2 Individuals
Individuals live for three periods. During young age, children invest all their
time (one unit) in human capital accumulation, from which they all receive
the same utility. Children's time input is combined with education bene¯ts,
provided by the workers, to develop their human capital which will be used
when working. Any di®erence in the per child education bene¯t will thus not
a®ect the utility in the ¯rst period of life, but will instead alter the human
capital. In the next period, when working, all supply inelastically their e®ec-
tive labor, the product of their one unit of time and their human capital and
receive wage income. A fraction of this wage income ¯nances the education
and pension systems; the remaining part will be divided between savings
and consumption. In the third and ¯nal period, individuals are retired and
consume their own savings and income from the pension system.
Since all generations gain the same utility when young this period is
suppressed. The lifetime utility of an individual, belonging to generation
t ¡ 1, is assumed to be additively separable according to:
Ut¡1 = lncw;t + ¯ lncr;t+1; (9)
where ¯ is the subjective discount factor and thus a measure of the individ-
ual's impatience to consume. Consumption per worker in period t is denoted
cw;t, while consumption per retired in period t is denoted cr;t.
9It can be noted that there are only slight di®erences in results between the FR scheme
and the FB scheme, while the former is somewhat more complicated to analyze.
7Denote by ht the human capital of generation t ¡ 1. This is a product of




where ¾ 2 (0;1] measures the elasticity of scale in the production of human
capital. The human capital determines the e®ective labor supply for each
individual in period t. The individuals take their human capital, wages, the
interest rate, the tax rate, and the bene¯ts in the pension system, as given.
Their only decision variable is savings, which they choose so as to maximize
lifetime utility, according to equation (9), subject to the following budget
constraints:
cw;t = (1 ¡ ¿t)wtht ¡ st; (11)
cr;t+1 = Rt+1st + bP;t+1: (12)
st denotes the per worker savings in period t, wt is the wage for one unit of
e®ective labor, and Rt+1 denotes the gross interest rate on savings between
period t and t+1. Further, ¿t denotes the total tax rate used in the ¯nancing
of the education and the pension systems, that is ¿t = ¿P;t + ¿E;t.
The individuals use their savings either for investments in domestic ¯rms
or to lend to the rest of the world (or borrow). So we have:
st = it + at; (13)
where it is the investments made in domestic ¯rms, and at is the amount lent
out to the rest of the world, which may be negative.
Maximizing the objective function (9) under the constraints (11) and (12)
yields the familiar intertemporal Euler equation:
cr;t+1 = ¯Rt+1cw;t: (14)
2.3 Production
The aggregate production function in the economy is assumed to be of Cobb-




where Lt is aggregate e®ective labor, i.e. Lt = htNt¡1, Kt is the aggregate
capital stock in the beginning of period t, and A is a scaling parameter. The
capital stock Kt depreciates fully during the production process. De¯ning






where yt = Yt=Nt¡1, and kt = Kt=Nt¡1.
8The prices of factor inputs are obtained from the ¯rms' maximization
problem, and since perfectly competitive factor markets are assumed prices











where Rt is the price on physical capital, and wt is the price per unit of
human capital, both in period t.
2.4 Capital mobility
Capital mobility determines the e®ect that demographic changes has on fac-
tor prices. The extreme cases are zero capital mobility, i.e. a ´ 0, and full
capital mobility such that a can °uctuate freely so as to keep the rate of re-
turn on capital constant. These cases correspond to the the closed economy
and the small perfectly open economy, respectively. By allowing for imper-
fect capital mobility it is possible to analyze the intermediate cases between
a small perfectly open economy and the closed economy. This is of interest
since not many economies are considered to be closed and there is ample
evidence that the ¯nancial integration is imperfect (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo®
(2000)).
There are many possible ways to model imperfect capital mobility, or
more correctly why capital °ows will be less than required to keep the interest
rate constant. In this paper limited capital mobility will be modelled in terms
of risk-premium, similar to the speci¯cation used in Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe






where Rw is the constant world interest rate, ½ > 0 is a scale parameter, and
ÁK 2 (0;1) is a measure of capital mobility, or degree of openness. When
ÁK = 1 then there is no risk-premium and a can vary freely so as to keep the
marginal return on investment constant, and equal with the world interest
rate, Rw. If ÁK = 0 then the risk-premium will be in¯nite which will lead to
zero capital mobility, i.e. a = 0.
Other speci¯cations would yield similar results.10 In essence there will be
a cost associated when trying to deviate from the autarky interest rate, how
large this cost is depends on ÁK.
10Trade costs as in Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) would require a more elaborated model,
while the outcome for factor prices would be similar.
92.5 Equilibrium
Given the initial capital stock, k0 > 0, the initial human capital stock,
h0 > 0, and population growth, fntg1
t=0, a competitive equilibrium for this
economy is a sequence of: prices fwt;Rtg1
t=0, allocations fcw;t;cr;t;it;atg1
t=0,
human and physical capital stocks fkt;htg1
t=0, and bene¯t rates and tax rates
f°E;t;°P;t;¿E;t;¿P;tg1
t=0, such that the individuals maximize their utility, ¯rms
maximize their pro¯ts, the budgets of the transfer systems are balanced, and
that markets clear. The market clearing condition can be reduced to:
kt+1 = it=nt; (19)
and it has to be such that equation (13) holds.
The saving decisions characterize the equilibrium, since they de¯ne the
equilibrium trajectory for fktg1
t=0 via eq. (19) and (13). Eqs. (11)-(14) and








where ¸t = ®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)°P;t+1=nt. The savings are divided between
investments, it, and capital transactions with rest of the world, at, in such a
way as to equalize the marginal return on investments with the interest rate;
that is, so that both equation (16) and equation (18) hold.
2.6 The intergenerational welfare function
To obtain a compact measure of how all generations are a®ected by a fertility







This is a pure utilitarian welfare function, implying neutrality towards the
inequality in the distribution of utility.11
There are di®erent views on how the per capita lifetime utility of gener-
ation t should be weighted. The question is if the utility should be weighted
by the generation size, and whether the utility of future generations should
be discounted. It seems more or less necessary to account for the generation
size, otherwise there would be an unequal treatment of individuals belonging
11Choosing a general utilitarian welfare function with aversion towards inequality be-
tween generations utility would strengthen the results obtained later in the paper.
10to generations of di®erent size. A social discount rate will be included and
the weighting factor will be the following:
Ãt=Ãt¡1 = ¯snt; (22)
where ¯s is the social discount rate. In the simulation the social discount
rate will be set equal to the individuals discount factor, i.e. ¯s = ¯. The
formulation allows for varying the social discounting as long as ¯s 2 (0;1=n].
If there is population growth then the discount rate should not exceed the
inverse of the population growth; if it does, then the future generations would
get an ever increasing impact on the welfare function, due to their larger
number.12
3 Simulation and calibration
3.1 Fertility rate
What is considered is a one period shock to the fertility rate. It is, however,
uncertain if the shock will be positive or negative. This is an ex ante analysis
similar to the one applied in Ball and Mankiw (2001).
The fertility rate can be stated as nt+j = n 8j 6= 0 and nt = n(1 + x),
where x is either a positive or negative disturbance. The steady state gross
population growth, n, will be set to 1.3, based on the annual average for the
U.S. between 1910-2001.13 Note that the each period corresponds to about
27 years. The size of the disturbance does not matter and it will be set to 20
percent, i.e. x = f¡0:2;0:2g.14 Changes in these numbers do not alter the
qualitative results.
The demographic structure used in the simulation can be stated as nt+j =
1:3 8j 6= 0 and nt = f1:04;1:56g.
3.2 Preferences
Regarding preferences, ¯ is the standard measure of the individual's impa-
tience to consume. Using the one year estimate from Auerbach and Kotliko®
(1987) of 0.98 translates to ¯ = 0:6, since every period represents about 27
years.
12See for instance Blanchet and Kessler (1991) and Boadway et al. (1991) for a short
comment concerning the weighting problem.
13The annual average, from National Vital Statistics Reports 51, no. 2, is approximately
1.01. This implies that per period n = 1:0127, since one period corresponds to 27 years.
14The size of the shock is well within reason if one considers the U.S. experiance.
113.3 Production
There are two parameters in the production function that need to be cali-
brated, ® and A. The share of capital income in the national product, ®,
is set to one third. The scale parameter A can be chosen freely since it will
not alter the relative outcome in any signi¯cant way. To make the results
between this study and · Zamac (2005) comparable, A will be set to 21.6.15
The world interest rate is assumed to be equal to the steady state interest
rate in autarky, implying that a = 0, in steady state. The parameter ½ in
equation (18) is chosen such that when ÁK = 0:5 and a disturbance occurs,
then the interest rate will deviate half the distance towards the autarky
interest rate. The debt will deviate half the distance towards the fully open
economy value after a disturbance when ÁK = 0:5.
3.4 The bene¯ts rate and human capital
Choosing the size of the education system and the pension system amounts
to calibrating the bene¯t rates in steady state, °E, and °P. These are set so
that the rate of return on human capital equals the rate of return on physical
capital in steady state. The bene¯t rates will thus be set to reproduce the
market outcome in steady state.
The rate of return on human capital, is determined by ¾. This implies
that the e±cient levels for °E and °P are functions of ¾ (and other parame-
ters already calibrated). Since ¾ is an exogenous parameter ideally one would
calibrate it and then infer the optimal values for °E and °P. Unfortunately
it is very hard to get an accurate measure for ¾. Card and Krueger (1992)
investigate how the pupil teacher ratio a®ects future productivity. Translat-
ing their results, via assumptions on how the spending per pupil is related
to the pupil teacher ratio, would yield ¾ = 0:165.
Since it is hard to obtain a measure for ¾ an alternative is to choose one
of the bene¯t rates from data, and then infer the ¾ that would equalize the
return on human capital with the return on physical capital. It is possible to
use the existing pension systems as a guideline. According to the U.S. Social
Security O±ce of the Chief Actuary the current bene¯t ratio, i.e. bene¯t to
the average wage ratio in the same period, is 0:42. In reality, however, the
ratio between working years and years of retirement is almost 2, while in this
three period model it is 1. This would lead to a bene¯t rate in the pension
system such that °P = 0:21.
15This value was chosen in · Zamac (2005) to ¯t the empirical growth rate of U.S., here
this is not an issue since only the stationary case is considered.
12This value for °P would require that ¾ = 0:16 and °E = 0:06, to equalize
the return on the two forms of capital. We see that ¾ is quite close to
the translated estimate from Card and Krueger (1992). What can be said
about the bene¯t rate in the education system? For the U.S. the GDP share
for primary and secondary school spending has been approximately 4 percent
during the last three decades and the GDP share for higher education is close
to 3 percent.16 The total share of GDP spent on education thus amounts to
7 percent. Note that a °E = 0:06 corresponds to ¿E = 0:08 which is not that
far from the reported estimates.
Table 1: Calibrated values for the exogenous parameters.
Parameter Value
Time preference ¯ 0.6
Share of capital income ® 1/3
E±ciency in human capital production ¾ 0.16
Steady state bene¯t rate in the pension system °P 0.21
Steady state bene¯t rate in the education system °E 0.06
Population gross growth rate n 1.3
Fertility shock x § 0.2
Total factor productivity A 21.6
Constant risk-premium parameter ½ 0.25
3.5 Steady state
Before the model is used to study the e®ects of fertility changes, it is useful
to report the steady state values for some key variables, according to the
calibration in table 1. The magnitude of the interest rate is quite realistic
Table 2: Steady state values according to cali-
bration in table 1.
Gross interest rate for capital R 2.74
Saving rate S=Y 3.7%
Capital output ratio k=y 0.12
when adjusting for the time length in the model.17 The saving ratio in
16See Rangazas (2002) p. 947.
17The reported interest rate is the compounded interest rate over 27 years, which on
annual basis becomes 3.8%.
13life-cycle models with no bequests has notorious di±culties to ¯t empirical
facts.18 As for other similar models the saving rate is considerably below the
comparable U.S. rate, which is around 6.7 percent. This should not cause
large problems as long as the capital output ratio is within reasonable range.
From table 2 the capital output ratio is 0.12, i.e. 3.2 times yearly GDP,
which is not far from the comparable U.S. ratio.
4 Results
4.1 Choosing ÁP and ÁE
We now let the generations decide behind the veil of ignorance which educa-
tion design and which pension design they will choose for a given degree of
openness. Figure 1 presents this choice, i.e. the ÁE and ÁP combination that
yields the highest expected welfare for di®erent degrees of openness, ÁK. In
the simulation the space [0,1] was evaluated at 51 points, with equal interval
of 0.02. This was done for all Áj where j = P;E;K.
Figure 1: Optimal pension and education combination at
di®erent degrees of capital mobility.




























It is clear that the pure FB pension scheme, ÁP = 1, is the preferred
18See Kotliko® and Summers (1981).
14design except for high degrees of capital mobility. We also see that the pure
FC pension scheme, ÁP = 0, is optimal in the small open economy.
The intuition behind the results can be understood as follows. Consider
a baby boom shock in one period only, i.e. nt+j = n8j 6= 0 and nt > n. This
will imply a burden in the education system, and who bears this burden will
be a distributional matter between the baby boom generation (the generation
born in period t) and their parent generation (the generation born in period
t ¡ 1). How the burden is divided between these generations is determined
by the scheme. If pure FB education design then the parents bear the whole
burden, and if pure FC education design the children bear the burden.
The e®ects in the pension system are similar but of opposite sign, instead
of a burden the baby boom creates a gain. This since there will be many
workers compared to the retirees in period t + 1, i.e. a temporary decrease
in the old age dependency. The allocation of this gain is determined by
the scheme, and it will also be a distributional matter between the baby
boom generation and the parent generation. If pure FB pension design then
the boom generation receives the gain, and if pure FC the parent generation
receives the gain. The e®ects in the education system and the pension system
are present irrespective of the degree of openness.
Consider ¯rst a fully closed economy, i.e. ÁK = 0. In this case, fertility
changes a®ect factor prices, besides the e®ects on the education system and
pension system. When the baby boom generation reaches productive age
there will be capital dilution. This since the savings by the parent generation
are not su±cient to equip the baby boom generation with the same capital
per worker as before. The capital dilution burdens the baby boom through
lower wage while the parent generation receives a higher interest rate on
their savings. For this reason it is desirable to let the baby boom generation
acquire the pension gain instead of the parent generation.
Consider now the other extreme for degree of openness, the fully open
economy, ÁK = 1, no e®ects on factor prices. The fertility will in this case
only e®ect the education system and the pension system, as described above.
There are two e®ects of opposite sign which both are a distributional matter
between same two generations. If the education system and the pension
system are of opposite type then the same generation will receive both the
burden and the gain. Otherwise, one generation will obtain the gain while
the other will obtain the burden. For this reason, the optimal systems strive
to be of opposite type in the small open economy.
Why is the education system FB and the pension system FC in the small
open economy, and not vice versa? This question can be answered by inves-




t+1 = bP;t+1=dE;t: (23)
Viewing education contributions as human capital investment and the pen-
sion bene¯ts as repayments for this investment makes RH
t+1 the implicit gross
return on human capital investments. For the small open economy the only
price that can vary is, RH
t+1, since R and w are ¯xed. Table 3 shows how RH
t+1
deviates after a fertility shock under the di®erent extreme cases in the open
economy. We see that when the factor price e®ect diminishes the systems
Table 3: RH
t+1=R for the extreme
cases in a fully open economy.
Pension Education
ÁE = 1 ÁE = 0
ÁP = 1 n=nt (n=nt)
¾
ÁP = 0 1 (nt=n)
(1¡¾)
strive towards the speci¯c combination ÁE = 1 and ÁP = 0 since this keeps
RH
t+1 constant. With this speci¯c combination the individuals in the small
open economy are una®ected by fertility °uctuations.
Note that the pension system and the education system when viewed
separately are sensitive to fertility °uctuations. The design will determine
which generation that will be a®ected, but it will not be possible to avoid the
e®ect. When viewed together, however, the e®ects cancel out for the right
design combination.
4.2 Choosing ÁP only
Here the choice over ÁE is not available, and what has to be decided upon
is ÁP that maximizes the objective function, for each combination of ÁE and
ÁK. This is a more general evaluation of the preferred pension design since it
covers all possible designs of the education system. The results are presented
in ¯gure 2.
Previous studies have showed that the factor price e®ect dominates the
gain in the pension system (e.g. Blomquist and Wijkander (1994); Bohn
(2001)) in the closed economy. That is, the pension gain can only alleviate
some of the burden from the factor price e®ect that the baby boom generation
su®ers from. Now we see that this result holds even for considerable degree
of capital mobility. We see that even half the response in factor prices,
compared to the closed economy response, is enough to motivate a pure FB
16Figure 2: Optimal pension combination for di®erent edu-
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Note: The black line indicates the ÁP and ÁE pair that yields the highest expected
welfare, at each degree of capital mobility, ÁK. This was also presented in ¯gure 1.
pension scheme irrespective of the education scheme. This indicates that the
factor price e®ect is strong compared to the education e®ect.
What emerges is that the pure FB pension scheme (i.e. ÁP = 1), is
preferred in most cases. The opposite, i.e. the pure FC pension scheme
(ÁP = 0), is only preferred in a fully open economy, ÁK = 1, when the
education system operates under a pure FB scheme, ÁE = 1.
5 The market outcome
An important motivation for state intervention is to correct for children's
inability to enter into agreements with the adults (e.g. Becker and Murphy
(1988), Rangel (2003), and Boldrin and Montes (2005)). One aim of public
transfers would then be to mimic the market outcome that would occur if
children where capable and allowed to make contractual agreements. This
section investigates what transactions that would arise in the market outcome
and compares these allocations with the transfers in the exogenous systems
as analyzed previously.
The children want to ¯nance their human capital accumulation by bor-
rowing from the workers. While the workers want to set aside assets for
17future consumption in a way that yields the highest return. The workers
would now decide how much to invest in each asset, i.e. human capital and
physical capital. Their maximization problem can now be stated as:
max
st;dE;t
U = lncw;t + ¯ lncr;t+1; (24)
subject to the following budget constraints:
cw;t = wtht ¡ st ¡ dE;t ¡ R
H
t bE;t¡1; (25)
cr;t+1 = Rt+1st + R
H
t+1dE;t; (26)
which leads to the following ¯rst order conditions:




From above we see that they will invest in the two assets in such a way as to
equalize their return, i.e. Rt+1 = RH
t+1. The e±cient level of human capital
investment would equalize the rate of return on savings with the marginal
rate of human capital.
The children (who have no opportunity cost of education, and who receive
the same utility irrespective of the quality of their education) are interested
in maximizing their future income. They want to maximize:
max
bE;t
¼ = wt+1ht+1 ¡ R
H
t+1bE;t; (29)







Could this market outcome be replicated by exogenous systems? To be
able to answer this question analytically only the extreme cases for capital
mobility are considered. The aim is to ¯nd the corresponding bene¯t rates in
the market outcome, for the closed economy and the small open economy.19
5.1 Rates in the "pension system"
Using equation (30) together with equation (23), and noting that the budget
balanced restriction in equation (1) now states a market clearing condition,
19Note that the bene¯t rates (and the contribution rates) are always possible to de¯ne
since these are just fractions of workers income.
18we get:
°P;t+1 = ¾nt (31)
¿P;t+1 = ¾ = ¿P: (32)
To replicate the market outcome the pension system should operate under a
pure FC pension scheme, i.e. ÁP = 0. This holds irrespective of the degree
of openness.
5.2 Rates in the "education system"
5.2.1 Closed economy
Solving for the workers maximization problem and using the demand condi-
tion for human capital according to equation (30), makes it possible to ¯nd
the respective investment level in physical and human capital, according to:
st =
¯®(1 ¡ ¾) ~ wt




¾ (1 ¡ ®)¯ (1 ¡ ¾) ~ wt
(1 + ¯)(® + ¾ (1 ¡ ®))
: (34)
From equation (34) it is then straight-forward to obtain the following bene¯t
rate and contribution rate, respectively:
°E;t =
¾ (1 ¡ ®)¯ (1 ¡ ¾)
nt (1 + ¯)(® + ¾ (1 ¡ ®))
(35)
¿E =
¾ (1 ¡ ®)¯ (1 ¡ ¾)
(1 + ¯)(® + ¾ (1 ¡ ®))
(36)
In the closed economy the market outcome resembles an education system
according to a pure FC scheme, i.e. ÁE = 0.
5.2.2 Small open economy
In this case factor prices are constant, which via workers' optimization implies
R = RH





19This condition is satis¯ed with a constant bene¯t rate.20 If we further assume
that the steady state interest rate for a closed economy is the same as the
world interest rate, then it is possible to obtain the following rates for the
education system:
°E =
¾(1 ¡ ®)¯ (1 ¡ ¾)
(1 + ¯)(® + ¾ (1 ¡ ®))n
; (38)
¿E;t =
¾(1 ¡ ®)¯ (1 ¡ ¾)nt
(1 + ¯)(® + ¾ (1 ¡ ®))n
: (39)
Thus, in a small open economy, the market outcome corresponds to an edu-
cation system with pure FB and a pension system with pure FC .
5.3 Market outcome and the exogenous systems
It is possible for the exogenous education and pension systems to mimic the
market outcome.21 What is needed, for the closed economy and the small
open economy, is to de¯ne the bene¯t rates as in the market outcome, as
presented in table 4.
Table 4: Bene¯t rates in the market outcome.
Open ec. Closed ec.
ÁK = 1 ÁK = 0
°P;t ¾nt¡1 ¾nt¡1






ÁE 1 (FB) 0 (FC)
With these bene¯t rates the systems will mimic the market outcome.
Without having any explicit link between the contributions to the education
system and the bene¯ts in the pension system, the systems will still behave
as if pension bene¯ts were a return on human capital investments.
20Note that FB education design in the small open economy implies ht = h8t.
21Boldrin and Montes (2005) note that it is di±cult to mimic the market outcome
without lump-sum taxation, since income taxation leads to distortions. In this model this
is not a problem due to inelastic labor supply. Moreover, it should be possible to avoid
such distortions if applying participation constraints in the pension system, similar to the
Swedish unfunded pension system. The Swedish pension system is a pure FC pension
system where the pension bene¯ts are related to life-time income.
20In the small open economy the exogenous ÁE and ÁP pair that maximized
expected welfare, is the same combination as in the market outcome. For
the closed economy this is not the case. The ÁE and ÁP pair presented in
table 1 yields a higher expected welfare than the market outcome. This is
no surprise since the market outcome did not allow for the generations to
specify contracts ex ante, before the uncertainty was realized, for all future
realizations.
Maximizing the welfare function ex ante incorporates the diversi¯cation
e®ect that the FB pension schemes o®ers. For nt > n the change in interest
rate will be such that Rt+1 > R (unless the economy is a small open one).
From table 3 it is clear that if the pension scheme is a pure FB scheme
then RH
t+1 < R, irrespective of education design. This will thus imply a
diversi¯cation e®ect, that all generations bene¯t from, given that they are
risk-averse. If the pension system is a pure FC scheme and the education
system a pure FC scheme then RH
t+1 moves together with Rt+1, and the
investment in human capital will thus not o®er any diversi¯cation e®ect.
6 Discussion
The underlying question in this paper was if a unfunded pension system with
a ¯xed contribution rate is desirable when considering changes in dependency
ratios. When considering fertility °uctuations from an ex ante perspective
then the optimal pension design was shown to depend crucially on the degree
of openness. For a closed economy a ¯xed bene¯t rate is preferred, which
con¯rms ¯ndings in other studies. It was further shown that this result
holds even with considerable degree of openness, and irrespective of how the
education system might be ¯nanced.
For a fully open economy the pure FC pension scheme is desirable if it
is possible to design the education system to be a pure FB scheme. This
speci¯c design combination for the education system and the pension system
implies that individuals in the small open economy are una®ected by fertility
°uctuations, even with large intergenerational transfer systems in place.
The paper also investigated what kind of allocations that would arise
in the market outcome when children and adults can enter into contractual
agreements. The ¯nding is that the resulting transactions in the closed econ-
omy resemble a pure FC pension scheme and a pure FC education scheme.
For the small open economy the arising allocations are the same as for the
pure FC pension scheme combined with a pure FB education scheme.
For the closed economy the market outcome does not yield the highest
expected welfare. This depends on the fact that the market outcome leads
21to the same rate of return on both human and physical capital. From an ex
ante perspective one would want these two form of capital to be negatively
correlated. This is accomplished by a pure FB pension scheme.
The opposing results about the pension scheme when viewed ex ante
(maximizing expected welfare) and when viewed ex post (market outcome
when the uncertainty has realized) leads to the question of sustainability. Is it
possible to impose a pension system that deviates from the market outcome?
This is left to future research but it is interesting that countries who have
re-designed their pension system have moved from a ¯xed replacement rate to
a ¯xed contribution rate (e.g. Sweden, Italy, Germany). This is noteworthy
since the ¯xed replacement rate can never replicate the market outcome. The
move towards FC could be motivated as an attempt to replicate the market
outcome, in which case it would require that the corresponding education
design is in place. This would, however, imply that unlucky generations, i.e.
the large ones, would bear a huge cost in economies that are not small and
open.
Linking the education design with the pension design is crucial to min-
imize the e®ects of fertility °uctuations. This does not imply that the two
should have a uni¯ed budget constraint, such that the pension bene¯ts will
depend on education contributions. What is needed is to specify how the sys-
tems will react to changes in dependency ratios. For this reason the long-term
intergenerational contract in the education system should be made explicit.
If we want to give equal opportunities of education, across generations, then
introducing an explicit educational long-term contract according to the FB
scheme might be warranted. If this would be the case then the FC pension
scheme is desirable for a small open economy.
There are many important aspects that have been left out from the anal-
ysis, e.g. uncertainties about the mortality rate, productivity, and the like.
The stylized model did not capture the e®ects that a varying tax rate could
have on the labor supply. Has this made the analysis biased towards the
FB scheme? This depends on whether the income or the substitution ef-
fect dominates. Another possibility is to make fertility endogenous. This
would probably lead to inclusion of altruism into the model. Including altru-
ism would probably not dismantle the qualitative prescriptions. This since
the results regarding preferred designs mainly rest on how di®erent designs
minimize the e®ects of fertility °uctuations. Moreover, assuming parental al-
truism towards children would probably strengthen the results since a large
cohort is worse o® than the parent generation even without altruism. The
fact that a large cohort is worse o® and that the preferred pension design tries
to compensate for this, implies that the results probably would be strengthen
if allowing for di®erent utilities during childhood.
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